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As If: Why Legal Scholarship Needs Assumptions
Shai Dothan*
A common accusation against Law and Economics is that it is based
on unrealistic and unreasonable assumptions, such as claiming that
people behave rationally. This accusation may very well be true. But it
should not stand in the way of progress in legal analysis. The reason is
that when something is assumed about facts—for example, how people
behave or, alternatively, about the best way to interpret a set of
judgments—the test of this assumption is in whether the hypotheses built
on it are supported or refuted by other facts. If an assumption does not
lead to accurate predictions, it can easily be discarded. In contrast,
conceptual analysis of law that tries to assess the nature of a legal norm
or field, for example establishing whether investment treaty arbitration is
a part of public international law or not, is not assuming anything about
facts. Because the only substance that is played with is concepts, no facts
can be brought to refute the argument, only competing narratives. The
purpose of this Article is to explain why the process of making assumptions
is necessary for legal scholarship and why it is impossible to understand
the law without assumptions and it could be dangerous to try to do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As often happens, the law on a certain point is ambiguous and could
be interpreted in several different ways. A Law and Economics scholar
suggests interpreting the law in a way that leads to an efficient result.1
“Why do you assume the law is efficient?” is the automatic reaction of
her Critical Legal Studies (CLS) adversary. “That is a legitimate
question,” she should say. I assume the law is efficient because by
explaining the law as if it leads to efficiency, I can make better sense of
more doctrines and make good predictions about how judges will decide
cases. Do you want to assume something else? What is your hypothesis?
This Article is not committed to the assumptions of Law and
Economics (the field assumes a lot of different things anyway). The
assumption that law leads to efficient solutions may be the wrong
assumption, because better predictions may just as well be forthcoming
under the assumption that the law is committed to some deontological
moral principles or anything else for that matter. This Article is only
committed to the necessity of making assumptions in legal scholarship.
The gist of the argument is that only by making assumptions—thinking
about the law as if it is designed to do something, even if there is no
evidence anyone ever intended it to do so—can progress be made in the
1 See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1986)
(referring to the “as if” type of argument used by Law and Economics scholars as a
hypothesis and says that it should be supported by evidence of a dynamic that makes
the hypothesis credible. But the “as if” assessment is not a hypothesis but an
assumption. A hypothesis uses this assumption and is checked against reality to see if
the hypothesis is correct or not, not whether the assumption is correct).
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analysis of the law. This Article does not attempt to find the perfect
assumptions to make sense of any legal regime, but it insists that making
assumptions is necessary.
Part II starts by reviewing some assumptions that are regularly
made in legal scholarship. It then explains the fallacy ingrained in trying
to decipher the concepts that stand behind the law. The Article then
makes three arguments for the inevitability of making assumptions.
First, openly making assumptions is the only way out of the
intellectual trap of trying to find the essence of the law. Those who
argue that the law has an essence are looking for conceptions that do
not just help to make sense of the law: they are supposed to constitute
the very being of the law. This is a fallacy that has normative
implications because once a conception of the law is identified, legal
solutions stem out of it without any concern for policy considerations.
Part III explains why conceptual thinking in law is wrong, and why this
means assumptions are necessary.
Second, making assumptions and openly declaring what they are is
the only way to sustain scientific inquiry as a collaborative enterprise.
Everyone has biases that affect their way of thinking and their view of
the world. It is tempting to combat these biases by trying to reveal them
and to present a relativistic account that is relevant only to people with
the same set of biases. But the result of this exercise is to turn science
into a cacophony of competing narratives without any prospect of
gradually improving the accumulated knowledge within the field. The
only way to make research useful for other people with different biases
is by clearly stipulating what assumptions are made, what hypotheses
are to be examined, and what conditions would falsify them. Part IV
argues that making assumptions is required to make legal scholarship
thrive as a field of research.
Third, making assumptions in legal research is an exercise in
humility that is essential to any form of liberal rule. The liberal
acknowledges that she does not know what the best legal solution is for
everyone, all things considered. To guide policy, a liberal must assume
some form of connection between the choices people make and what is
good for them. Governments should assume people are rational, or at
least boundedly rational, even if this assumption does not always hold
true because such an assumption implies respect for people’s choices. A
regime that does away with assumptions aspires to know all the best
solutions for all its citizens all the time. Such a utopian worldview is
bound to deteriorate into tyranny. Part V suggests that lawyers who do
not make assumptions can actually be dangerous to any form of
liberalism.
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The conclusion from this analysis is that nothing that can be said
about the law is true forever and in every case. There are legal
principles such as efficiency, consistency, and proportionality which
explain many legal doctrines and can therefore serve as good
assumptions to make sense of the law. To say the same thing differently,
these principles are assumptions that can lead to the adoption of
hypotheses that make good predictions about the content of legal
doctrines. But in some unique situations, hypotheses that are based on
these assumptions do not lead to good predictions—they do not make
sense of certain doctrines. In these situations, the assumptions should
simply be discarded for better ones; better not because they are truer
but because hypotheses based on them lead to good predictions.
II. LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS
A. The Proper Thinking About Doctrine
In an essay about the methodology of economics, Milton Friedman
develops a theoretical framework to demonstrate why assumptions
should not be judged by how realistic they are. He gives a powerful
example: imagine that you are trying to predict how much time it takes
for a free-falling body thrown from a building to reach the ground. If
you are throwing a metal ball, the assumption of no air resistance can
lead to a good prediction. If you are throwing a feather, assuming no air
resistance would lead to a plainly wrong prediction.2
In both cases, the hypothesis is the same: that a free-falling body
covers a distance given by the formula 1/2gt2 where g is approximately
9.81 meters per squared second. The assumption is also exactly the
same: no air resistance. And yet in one setting the assumption leads to
good results, while in another setting it leads to false ones.3 The moral
of this demonstration is that assumptions should not strive to be
realistic.
In fact, Friedman goes as far as saying that good assumptions are
always untrue because the purpose of the assumption is to build a
hypothesis that explains the most phenomena by the least factual detail.
Irrelevant circumstances should not factor into the calculation, and
assumptions about them can therefore be deliberately false,4 just like
assuming no air resistance when throwing a metal ball.

2 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY
ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 145, 154 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3rd ed. 2007).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 153.
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What is the connection between Friedman’s theory on the
methodology of economics and the law? Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
famous essay The Path of the Law actually describes the law in a way
that is rather similar to Friedman’s view of economics. According to
Holmes, the law is only a set of predictions about what courts will do in
fact—for example, what penalty they will impose in a criminal case.
Many of the details in any legal case do not affect that prediction and can
therefore be safely ignored. Holmes gives the example of the color of
the hat worn by a party to a contract. The color of the hat is not a legally
relevant fact and it can be omitted completely from legal texts.5
While the color of hats is simply not mentioned by lawyers, there
are situations in which lawyers need to make an assumption that is
factually false but can lead to good predictions of what judges will do in
fact. One example is the doctrine of the reasonable person as applied in
the so-called Hand Formula. The Hand Formula determines that a
person has been negligent if she did not take a precaution that costs less
than the damage she could have averted multiplied by the probability of
its occurrence.6 The law assumes that reasonable persons take more
care in such cases even if almost everyone in that situation would have
done the same thing. This assumption can lead to finding people
negligent even if they did not behave any different than the social norm.7
The specific assumption here is that a reasonable person would be
more careful, even though most real people would behave the same. But
the larger and more interesting assumption in this situation is that the
law as a whole complies with the dictates of efficiency. Efficiency
determines the standard of care required, not the actual behavior of
people in society. If you know what the efficient result is, you know how
a judge would decide the case.
Another assumption made by lawyers is that the law is consistent.
A legal doctrine is considered better by the mere fact that it promotes
the predictability of the law. To serve that end, the doctrine itself has to
be predictable. It has to match as much as possible the other relevant
rules and judgments. The only problem is that sometimes legal
doctrines do not fit together as neatly as this assumption seems to
suggest. Consistency is a useful assumption most of the time because it
can lead to good predictions of how judges usually behave. When better
5 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458
(1897).
6 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 84 (2011).
7 See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 NYU L. REV. 323, 326
(2012) (contrasting this normative definition of the reasonable person with a positive
definition that looks at what most people would actually do in that situation).
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predictions of judicial behavior can be made under the assumption of
inconsistency, the assumption of consistency must simply be discarded.
The same goes for proportionality. Legal responses across many
legal fields comply with the principle of proportionality.8 If you want to
settle an ambiguity in the laws of war, criminal law, or international
sales law, assuming that the law is committed to proportionality would
usually lead to good predictions of what judges will do. Proportionality
can therefore usually serve as a good guide for scholars. But there are
situations in which proportionality would not lead to good incentives,
and legal doctrine has adapted to these situations by systematically
digressing from proportionality in these cases.9
Sometimes
proportionality is not a good assumption because it does not lead to
good predictions.
All these assumptions may seem like a useful way to predict what
judges will do when faced with legal ambiguity. But H.L.A. Hart raised
an important objection to Holmes’s view of judging as predicting the
actions of judges. Hart argued that judging cannot be based only on
prediction because then it would force judges who are considering their
own course of action in a case before them to base it on the prediction
of what they would do themselves.10
The solution to this false paradox may not be that difficult. It was
presented most clearly by the founder of Scandinavian Legal Realism,
Alf Ross. Ross explained that the task of the legal scholar making sense
of the law is not to put herself in the shoes of the judge.11 The scholar
does not share the normative commitments of the judge, but she is able
to describe the judge’s normative commitments. The scholar is able to
build hypotheses about the judge’s normative commitments and test
her predictions using the judge’s actual behavior.12
8 See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International
Law, 102 AMER. J. INT’L L. 715, 715–16 (2008).
9 See generally Shai Dothan, When Immediate Responses Fail, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1075 (2018) (demonstrating how the laws of war, criminal law, and international
sales law can usually be explained based on the assumption of commitment to
proportional responses. But in cases of acute uncertainty, legal doctrines cannot be
explained well based on the proportionality assumption, and a pattern of delayed and
disproportional responses is mandated by the law. Insights from experimental game
theory explain this shift.).
10 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 102 (1961); Stephen R. Perry, Holmes versus
Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 158, 188 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000).
11 See Jakob v. H. Holtermann, A Straw Man Revisited: Resettling the Score between
H.L.A. Hart and Scandinavian Legal Realism, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2017)
12 See id. at 19 (explaining that though it is impossible to know what judges actually
believe, it is possible to construct hypotheses about the convictions of judges and test
them against the judges’ actual behavior); ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 89 (2019).
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Like any theory based on hypotheses, scholars need to make
assumptions, and just like Friedman articulated clearly regarding
economics, these assumptions may just as well be false yet lead to true
predictions. For example, a legal scholar may argue that the main
purpose of criminal law is to deter criminals. She can hypothesize that
judges will assign penalties that comply with the Becker model, which
stipulates that criminals will be deterred if the penalty they are expected
to receive if caught, multiplied by the probability of getting caught, is
higher than the benefit they derive from committing the crime.13 The
scholar assumes that judges assume people are making rational costbenefit calculations. It may be untrue that people are rational, and it
may also be untrue that judges use cost-benefit calculations when they
assign penalties; still, the Becker model may serve as the best predictor
of the magnitude of penalties. If using the rationality assumption
succeeds in predicting the magnitude of penalties, it is useful, and the
scholar can employ it. If it does not, it should be abandoned regardless
of what either potential criminals or judges are actually thinking.
B. The Error in Thinking About Law Through Concepts
While this may sound obvious to some readers, the matter is
confusing to many lawyers. Some lawyers devote considerable
intellectual energy to trying to distill concepts that they believe lie at the
core of the law.
For example, a book-length study argues based on a series of
analogies and comparisons that investment treaty arbitration is a part
of public law.14 This argument is not susceptible to pragmatic analysis.
It is not trying to predict anything concrete about human behavior, but
rather to describe some mythical essence that is not conducive to
scientific exploration.
This does not mean that applying public law doctrines to
investment treaty arbitration would lead to bad results. In fact, another
monograph makes the case that applying principles of public law to
regulate investment treaty arbitration may lead to good outcomes. But
this is an argument made based on functional reasons: arbitrators’
interests bias them in favor of business and create a need for
counterbalance in the form of public law principles.15 There is an
13 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 181–82 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 47–48 (2000).
14 See generally ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).
15 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152–53 (2007).
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argument that can be tested empirically. Maybe it is true and maybe it
is false, but it is susceptible to scientific inquiry.
Searching for concepts that are supposed to represent the essence
of legal doctrine is wrong because it makes statements that cannot be
established scientifically. The philosopher of science Alfred Jules Ayer
argued in his famous book Language, Truth and Logic that the only
statements that can be verified are either empirical hypotheses or
logical tautologies.16 Such propositions can be either true or false, and
the scientific method may determine if they are true with different levels
of certainty.17 In contrast, metaphysical statements—statements about
the essence of things—are simply nonsense, at least from the
perspective of science, since their truth value cannot be established.18
While Ayer’s argument has been refuted on logical grounds as far as
individual statements are concerned, it is useful for explaining entire
scientific theories.19
Legal scholarship complies with the need to reject metaphysical
statements. In fact, Felix Cohen also uses the word nonsense to describe
the use of legal concepts to make claims that cannot be contested on
either ethical or empirical grounds. 20 Law as a self-referential system
of concepts is nonsense because it does not say anything that can be
proven true or false.21
16

ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 41 (1952).
Id. at 35.
18 Id. at 43.
19 Ayer and other followers of logical empiricism generally claimed that all
meaningful statements have to be verifiable, but that claim was exposed to significant
criticism. In response to this criticism, Rudolf Carnap was willing to withdraw to the
narrower claim that it is only scientific statements that need to verifiable. By their
nature, scientific statements are subject to disputes in the scientific community. The
only way to settle such a dispute is by using logic and empirical evidence. See Logical
Empiricism in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 4.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017).
For a very detailed and technical analysis of the failure of logical empiricism on
analytical examination see 1 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: THE DAWN OF ANALYSIS 274–99 (2003). To salvage some of logical empiricism’s
insights regarding whole theories, Carl Hempel explained that theoretical claims are
meaningful when they combine a set of observational statements and hypotheses that
can be used to make testable predictions. Empirical content is not to be assessed in each
individual statement but in the system as a whole, which is geared for empirical
prediction. Similarly, Willard Van Orman Quine explained that meaning requires
verification based on observational consequences, but these cannot be reduced to
sentences and must be derived from entire theories. See id. at 296–97. Quine’s
explanation why sentences do not have individual meaning, only theories, is that the
connection between every sentence and the evidence itself is mediated through other
sentences in the theory. See id. at 383–84.
20 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 820 (1935).
21 Id. at 821.
17
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Cohen argues for understanding law based on the functional
approach—law is a prediction of what courts will do.22 When law is
understood in this way, scholars can easily state that the law is such and
such as an empirical matter because this is what judges actually do.
They can proceed to criticize this judicial tendency on ethical grounds
without falling into any logical contradiction.23
Even Cohen, writing in 1935, was not saying something completely
original. At the beginning of his famous essay, he refers to the work of
Von Jhering, who some fifty years earlier criticized the use of concepts
in legal scholarship.24 What Jhering expressed in German, Ross
expressed in Danish, and Holmes and Cohen expressed in English is a
true cross-cultural resistance to a particular kind of legal fiction—legal
concepts that cannot be subjected to empirical inquiry.
Assumptions are also a form of fiction: they refer to things that do
not exist, and the scholar should not even care about their truth value.
But when you combine an assumption with a hypothesis and test this
hypothesis against facts, you can verify if the hypothesis is true or false.
This is why assumptions are necessary in every field of science.25
Although easily confused, assumptions do not share the ills of
conceptual thinking. The rest of this Article is dedicated to the argument
that making assumptions in legal scholarship is the only cure to the
relentless malaise of conceptual thinking.
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST ESSENTIALISM
In 1921, the Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig wrote a short
book called The Little Book of Healthy and Sick Human Understanding to
make his complicated philosophical views more accessible. In this book,
Rosenzweig decries the practice of philosophizing about the essence of
things instead of using common sense to act in the real world.26
Rosenzweig was not alone in perceiving the importance of focusing on
22

Id. at 839.
See id. at 839–42.
24 Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Concepts: A Fantasy, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 799,
802 (1985). Jhering mocked the use of legal concepts with a humorous text describing
a Roman law scholar who dies and goes to the heaven of legal concepts. In this heaven,
legal concepts exist in their pure form so that every legal question can be solved simply
by analyzing the concepts and without any need for factual observation and practical
considerations. The text was originally published in German in 1884.
25 For an enormously comprehensive exploration of the use of assumptions in
numerous fields of science, see H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF’: A SYSTEM OF THE
THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., 2009)
(1924).
26 FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, DAS BÜCHLEIN VOM GESUNDEN UND KRANKEN MENCHENVERSTAND
(1964).
23
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the impact things have instead of on their essence. Writing in 1907,
William James launched a whole field of philosophy known as
Pragmatism. In a book that carries the same name, he explains that the
focus of philosophy should not be on the essence of concepts but on their
actual consequences, which he called their “cash-value.”27 What is true
for philosophy is true for legal scholarship. This Part will demonstrate
what healthy and pragmatic legal thinking should look like.
A. Healthy Legal Thinking
A simple example of healthy legal thinking appears in Karl
Llewellyn’s classic guide to law students, The Bramble Bush.28 Students
are instructed to extract the rules on offer and acceptance sufficient to
form a contract from actual cases. In one case, a person has made an
offer and manages to deliver a revocation before his offer is accepted.
The court ruled that in this case the meeting of minds necessary for a
contract to materialize did not take place. In another case, a person
makes an offer, and a letter of acceptance is sent to him before his
revocation is received. The court decided that a contract was formed.29
The two cases may appear contradictory, but it is easy to extract a
general doctrine that agrees with both of them: even if the two sides are
not simultaneously interested in the contract, the contract would stand
if the person receiving the offer reasonably believes that the offer still
stands when she accepts it.30
This legal reasoning is healthy because it is based on trying to make
sense of the institution of contracts in the most effective way. To do that,
the reasoning is based on assumptions and hypotheses, even if
extracting them is not always easy. In the second case mentioned above,
an assumption is made that a person stands by his offer until his letter
of revocation is received, even if that happens not to be true. The reason
is that based on this assumption, one can hypothesize that a contract is
formed in such cases, which would explain in the best possible way
judges’ rulings in contract cases.
Llewellyn explained that the doctrinal rule should be pushed up to
the point when it does not make sense anymore. If the person who
accepted the offer reasonably believed no revocation was sent, but his
clerk already received the revocation letter, maybe the rule should be

27

WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1st ed.
1907).
28 K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951).
29 Id. at 49–50.
30 Id.
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different.31 Maybe a person should be assumed to know everything her
clerk knows at the time when she attempts to accept an offer. The only
question is what assumption would help to construct a hypothesis about
the existence or nonexistence of the contract that would make sense of
the most judgments.
In cases of doubt, one can turn to a higher level of assumptions,
such as the assumption that the law strives for efficiency, to determine
what should be assumed about the will of the parties. If the law is
assumed to be efficient, maybe people should be assumed to stand by
their offers until they formally deliver a revocation letter. The reason is
that people making such offers are the ones that can most easily make
sure their revocation letters are received in time. They are the so-called
least-cost avoider.32 The same line of reasoning may just as well dictate
that people should be assumed to know all that is known to their clerks.
Healthy legal thinking complies with the Latin phrase natura non
facit saltus: it makes no leaps but rather evolves steadily, always keeping
in sight the logic of the precedents it chooses to follow. Legal thinking
uses precedents because if cases involve similar policy considerations,
a judge deciding the later case can rely on the prior judgment to make a
satisfactory policy decision.33 By making a decision with the same policy
outcomes as past judgments, a judge or a scholar can follow the
normative commitments of the community of judges. The key is not that
the cases are similar in some abstract sense but that their similarity is
relevant to their policy choices.
If the name of the person making the offer in the first Llewellyn
scenario is Olixander, and that is exactly the name of the person making
the offer in the second scenario, this bizarre coincidence has absolutely
no legal significance. Neither would the fact that both individuals are
avid water polo fans, or the fact that both have a parrot called Bobbie.
Legal analysis that proceeds through assumptions and hypotheses
abstracts away all the irrelevant information, leaving only factors with
concrete policy implications. The examples just mentioned are clearly

31

Id. at 50.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095–97 (1972)
(explaining that the need to search for the least-cost avoider arises because the
assumption of no transaction costs often must be discarded and replaced by
assumptions that admit of certain transaction costs to predict the actual efficiency of
human interaction. Under the assumption of no transaction costs, the market will
always revert to the efficient solution.); Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract
Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 406 (2004) (applying the least cost avoidance
reasoning, which is regularly used in tort law, to solve agency problems in contract law).
33 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 600 (1987).
32
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absurd—no one would make the mistake of taking these irrelevant
peculiarities into account. But serious scholars make the mistake of
taking things into account that are just as irrelevant because they think
they reveal the “essence” of the law.
B. What Is Wrong with Conceptual Legal Thinking
The opposite of healthy legal thinking is conceptual legal thinking.
Conceptual analysis involves copying legal choices from one legal
setting to another solely because of some abstract similarity between
the two settings, and without taking into account the purpose of the
copied legal choice. This way of reasoning is an invalid form of
“reasoning by analogy” because it applies legal concepts in a way that is
autonomous of their policy goals.
Reasoning by analogy that ignores policy considerations is
intellectually flawed because the similarity between two legal cases is
relevant only when it implies that the past case and the judgment
advocated for have similar policy outcomes.34 If scholars seek to predict
judges’ behavior through analogies, they should usually explain the
policy considerations that justify the analogy. Alternatively, they can
admit that only similarities affecting policy outcomes are relevant but
claim convincingly that they can identify such similarities without
observing directly the policy outcomes involved. Some scholars
relegate the task of defining what similarities are relevant to the realm
of legal expertise and intuition,35 and others refer to elaborate
techniques that can make this determination even without considering
policy considerations directly.36
If a scholar instead tries to distill some concept that can carry over
from one case to the other, she misunderstands the nature of legal
analysis. Such concepts are fictions, but—unlike assumptions—they are
not useful fictions that can lead to accurate hypotheses or be discarded.
34 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 756–57
(1993); Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765 (2006).
35 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 59–60
(2nd ed. 2016).
36 See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 948–49, 962–63 (1996)
(suggesting that it is possible to extract from specific doctrines a general rule that
reflects the commitments of judges through an analytical technique known as abduction.
Abduction can never prove conclusively that the rule reflects the commitments of
judges, but it can serve as an educated guess.); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 751–54
(describing a technique known as reflective equilibrium that allows scholars to compare
general rules and specific doctrines that they think reflect the commitments of judges.
By modifying both types of sources simultaneously to better match each other, the
process gets the scholar closer to understanding the commitments of judges.).
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Because the concept is not systematically checked against the actual
behavior of judges, it can easily lead to arbitrary results.
As an example, consider a recent paper arguing that English tort
law is committed to serving the function of vindication—affirming
certain protected interests.37 According to this paper, a concept can be
distilled from the law and can lead to normative implications, such as
recommending damages regardless of proving harm, at least if there are
no countervailing policy considerations.38
It is perfectly possible that English tort law is explained well as if it
follows the function of vindication. In that case, the judges’
commitments can be predicted based on the assumption that vindication
is their goal. If, based on this assumption, a hypothesis that damages are
granted without proving harm is made and it is confirmed by observing
judicial behavior, the assumption can be kept. But if such a hypothesis
is refuted by observing real judgments, then the assumption should
simply be rejected.
Scholars have zero commitment to the truth value of their
assumptions. If the assumption does not lead to hypotheses that predict
the normative commitments of judges, as evidenced by their actual
behavior, it will be discarded. In contrast, thinking about the law
through concepts implies a commitment to a certain view of the law,
even if scholars sometimes qualify this commitment by indicating that
the law has multiple functions and is different in some areas compared
to others.39
Some supporters of conceptual legal thinking argue that it helps to
organize the way scholars think about the law, as a form of “legal
metaphysics.”40 If concepts are employed only for their aesthetic
qualities, this way of thinking may not cause any harm. But it certainly
would not do any good either. Indeed, the vibrant debate in philosophy
on whether certain universal characteristics constitute the essence of
law has no normative implications.41 If a theorist presupposes that
every legal system has certain properties, by her logic any social
37 See Jason N. E. Varuhas, The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights
Interests and Damages, 34 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 253, 256 (2014).
38 See id. at 256.
39 See id. at 260, 292–93 (arguing that some areas of the law serve the function of
vindication less than others); id. at 275 (stating that certain areas of the law apply
specific legal solutions that are different from the main doctrine).
40 See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, Conceptual Jurisprudence: An Introduction to
Conceptual Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory, 26 REVUS 65, 83, 91 (2015).
41 See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?, 30
RATIO JURIS 3 (2017) (reviewing and criticizing the scholarship that argues there are
certain things that constitute the essence of the law).
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institution that does not have these properties would be nonlegal.42 In
contrast, when concepts are later used to make normative
recommendations, as is done in invalid forms of reasoning by analogy,
such use causes real damage to legal analysis.
Some scholars choose a different path: they clearly disavow any
claim to describe the law and instead promote a project that is focused
only on the question of what legal doctrines can be justified based on
some coherent set of principles.43 For them, a legal doctrine, even an
established one, that does not comply with the required level of
coherence is simply a legal mistake.44 By preventing any possibility of
refutation by doctrines that exist in the real world, this system of
reasoning may conveniently achieve logical consistency. But at the
same time, by committing to coherence at all costs, it forfeits both its
ability to describe the normative commitments of real judges45 and the
possibility of defending policy choices based on any other grounds
besides its own autonomous set of principles.46 These are unacceptable
concessions that have been rightly criticized throughout the modern
era.
More than a century ago, Roscoe Pound criticized conceptual
thinking in law, calling it by the derogatory name “mechanical
jurisprudence.”47 Pound explained that creating concepts and using
them to recommend normative solutions without accounting for their
social implications is unjustified.48 Similarly, a scholar who extracts
concepts from judicial behavior and uses them to explain the normative
commitments of judges in other areas without actually checking those
judges’ behavior is making unwarranted choices.
Conceptual legal analysis is like a sea monster that grows two new
heads every time it is beheaded. It seems like the only way to avoid
unhealthy conceptual thinking and to slay the sea monster is to offer a
methodologically sound substitute for legal concepts. This substitute is
a methodology that admits it works through assumptions that may be
42 See id. at 20; Joseph Raz, Can There Be a Theory of Law, in BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324, at \1 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds. 2005).
43 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW XIX (2012).
44 Id. at 13.
45 Id. at 31–32 (A system that completely defies coherence would be unintelligible
on this account) See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEG. THEO. 457,
468–69 (2000) (describing the first concession)
46 WEINRIB, supra note 43 at 17–18, 55; See Zipursky, supra note 45 at 469
(describing the second concession)
47 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
48 See id. at 612.

DOTHAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

12/23/2020 9:33 PM

AS IF

659

untrue or inaccurate. By working through assumptions, scholars can
avoid the confusion associated with commitment to concepts that
supposedly reflect some essence of the law; scholars can choose instead
to adopt assumptions only if they can lead to hypotheses that are
confirmed by real judicial behavior.
If it is assumed that a person making an offer stands by it until her
letter of revocation is received, this assumption does not stem from the
concept or the “essence” of contract. The assumption is useful to form a
hypothesis that judges would recognize a contract in these conditions.
When conditions change, this hypothesis may be refuted—it will not
represent judges’ decisions. The scholar may have to adopt a different
assumption; for example, that a revocation letter should be considered
received when it is accepted by the clerk of the person receiving the
offer. Assumptions are responsive to facts and can always be checked
against them.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR SYSTEMIC ACCURACY
A. Theoretical Background
The CLS movement disputes the existence of two qualities that are
often used to justify the law: formalism and objectivism. Formalism
means the existence of legal doctrine that is distinct from ideological
positions.49 Objectivism is the view that legal analysis can proceed
based on neutral constraints on human organization that are detached
from the power struggles in society.50
CLS criticizes fields of legal scholarship that adhere, directly or
indirectly, to the idea that law can be studied objectively. For example,
CLS scholars criticize the Law and Economics movement because it tries
to appear formalist and objective while adhering to a specific form of
economic theory that is grounded in a particular history and serves
certain interests.51
The gist of this Part is to explain why, even if scholars applying Law
and Economics, or any other field of legal scholarship, are indeed biased,
this poses no problem for the objectivity of legal science within these
fields. The solution to scholars’ biases is not to try to debias themselves
by exposing their hidden ideological leanings, as CLS suggests.52 The
49 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 564 (1983).
50 Id. at 565.
51 Id. at 574–75.
52 Id. at 578–80. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (1987)
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solution is rather to sustain a scientific practice that allows for
systematic testing of the ideas ingrained in legal scholarship.
The notion that objectivity in science cannot and should not stem
from the scientists’ individual efforts to debias themselves underlies
Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. Popper explained that a scientist
can never be sure of the objectivity of her discovery. Inner conviction in
the truthfulness of results is scientifically meaningless. The only
scientific objectivity that should be aspired to is making statements that
can be intersubjectively tested. This means that a scientist needs to
assure that every experiment that leads to a scientific discovery can be
reproduced.53
Legal science does not proceed based on experiments in the
physical world, but it should be constrained by the same commitment
to intersubjective testability. A statement about the law should be
testable by anyone regardless of their gender, race, or social class.
Because every scholar brings with her a package of ideological
inclinations that cannot be fully debiased, the key to allowing testability
of her ideas is in the methodology that she uses. Any attempt to get rid
of individual biases will produce statements that are not truly objective
and that cannot be systematically checked by other scholars.
In contrast, the scientific practice of making assumptions and being
frank about them is the only way to ensure the testability of statements
about the law. Once the assumptions are in place, every scholar can
check whether the proposed hypotheses about the law are indeed
confirmed by the facts. For example, if the assumption is that criminals
behave rationally, every scholar can check if real criminal punishments
concur with the Becker model.54 If they do not, the assumption can be
simply replaced by a more fitting one.
B. International Law as a Case Study
Legal doctrine is often the product of social struggles that belie any
claim for objectivity. For example, scholars have argued that
international law is not a universal and objective system of rules.
Rather, international law is created by groups of lawyers with different
nationalities, education, and political interests who pull legal doctrine in
different directions.55 Furthermore, some groups of lawyers pull
(criticizing CLS scholars’ idealistic program to change the way lawyers think about the
world, which they claim is imprisoned in an unjustified commitment to protect the
status quo).
53 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 22–26 (2002).
54 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
55 ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 6 (2017).
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stronger than others and bias international law in a direction preferable
to them. For historical reasons, international law is largely tilted toward
Western states’ interests and legal choices.56
The exposure of the sociological pressure that made international
law what it is today has great scientific merit. But it is an exercise in
sociology, not in understanding legal doctrine. When a scholar seeks to
understand legal doctrine, she must build a theory that in the most
parsimonious way describes the normative commitments of judges. The
historical reasons for the development of judicial behavior are
irrelevant for this prediction. Being aware of these historical reasons
may help a scholar guess how law is going to evolve or explain the
motives of individual judges, but it does not help to understand what
judges view as their commitment to the law.57
If a scholar makes a statement about the law, her statement has to
be objective—not in the sense that it is necessarily true, but in the sense
that it can be contested or checked on empirical grounds by any other
legal scholar. If a scholar were to say, “I am American, and therefore I
need to correct for my biases by viewing international law differently
than my initial inclination,” her observations about international law
would not converse with the views of any other scholar. Because the
American scholar can never be trusted to fully debias herself and adopt
an objective view, her statements about the law are useless for the
scientific community. Even if such statements are made with conviction,
they are not scientific.
In contrast, the claim that international law is Eurocentric is
susceptible to empirical investigation and can in principle be checked
by any other scholar. Unless judges view it as normatively legitimate to
openly serve Western interests, however, such a claim has to be
investigated with nonlegal tools such as a sociological or historical
inquiry. Such a claim may point out the reasons that historically caused
the law to become what it is, but it does not point to the purpose that
the legal system today tries to fulfill. It says nothing about the judges’
commitments or what they would view as legitimate legal arguments.58
Therefore, such a claim is scientific, but not legal.

56

Id. at 9.
See Jakob v. H. Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, European New Legal Realism
and International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L.
211, 215–20 (2015) (explaining that while the legal scholar does not share the
normative commitments of the judges, she offers a description of these normative
commitments (“perceptions of axiological validity” to use the terminology of the
paper)).
58 See id.
57
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The only way to make a claim that is both legal and scientific is to
use the structure that is advocated in this Article, namely make
assumptions and test hypotheses based on them. Take, for example, the
claim that international law is committed to order more than it is
committed to justice.59 To test that claim, it is possible to assume that
international law is committed to order and check if hypotheses formed
under this assumption lead to accurate predictions of international
judgments. If they do, one could argue that international law can be
explained as if it is committed to order. If they do not, the assumption
of commitment to order must be discarded.
For example, a scholar could assume that the legal doctrine on
maritime delimitation is more committed to order than to justice and
use it to construct a hypothesis on how the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) would decide disputes. The hypothesis can either be refuted or
confirmed based on the empirical investigation of ICJ judgments.
Assuming commitment to order, the natural hypothesis is that the ICJ
would draw maritime borders based on the equidistance line—which
protects order and certainty. In fact, ICJ judgments on the subject
fluctuated between applying the equidistance line and taking equity
concerns into account.60 Therefore, it is possible that an assumption
that international law is committed to order would not lead to good
hypotheses about ICJ practice in this specific area and would have to be
replaced with an assumption of a commitment to justice.61
Because scientific claims are open for contestation by any scholar,
the common view accepted by the scientific community emerges as a
shared paradigm. Thomas Kuhn described the way paradigms in
science change in his famous book The Structure of Scientific
59

See ANDERS HENRIKSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17–18 (2nd ed., 2019).
See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed. Republic of
Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 51–52 ¶ 89–91 (Feb. 20) (observing that according to the
equidistance method, the Federal Republic of Germany would get a small continental
shelf compared to the length of its coastline because of its concave shape. The court
decided that the parties should take into account also the proportionate length of
coastlines when they negotiate a solution to avoid an unjust result.); see also Tanaka
Yoshifumi, Reflections on the Concept of Proportionality in the Law of Maritime
Delimitation,16 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 433, 434–43 (2001) (referring to more
decisions by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals on division of continental shelves).
61 See Malcolm D. Evans, The Law and the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 676–80 (Malcom
D. Evans eds., 4th ed., 2014) (following the equidistance line can lead countries with a
concave coastline caught between two other states to get a very small continental shelf
compared to the length of their coastline. Considerations of equity can mitigate against
that, but note that this is a very limited view on equity. International courts do not
consider economic factors and distributive justice when they determine maritime
disputes. Therefore, even if there have been digressions from the order dictated by the
equidistance line, they did not go all the way to sustain an ideal of justice.).
60
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Revolutions.62 His analysis is relevant also for changes in legal
paradigms. Legal scholars can use the paradigmatic view of the legal
community as an assumption and build their hypotheses of what is the
law on a specific issue based on that paradigmatic view. When the
assumption leads to inaccurate predictions vis-à-vis a specific doctrine,
it can be discarded regarding the analysis of that doctrine and possibly
kept regarding others. If a critical mass of doctrines cannot be explained
based on the assumptions shared by a certain paradigm, a paradigm
shift can occur.
For example, when Wolfgang Friedmann described international
law as shifting from the “law of coexistence,” concerned with regulating
conflicts between competing states, to the “law of cooperation,”
concerned with sustaining collaboration and forming effective
institutions, he was describing a classical paradigm shift.63 One could
take the claim that the world today is described by the law of
cooperation as an assumption and use it to build a hypothesis about the
amount of deference, or margin of appreciation, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) shows to member states of the Council of Europe.
Scholars have indeed argued that the margin of appreciation granted to
states takes into account many elements of governance and not just the
sovereignty of the states involved.64 The practice of the ECHR is
therefore explained well under the assumption that international law is
a law of cooperation.
Not all paradigms have to be phrased at such a high level of
generality. One could, for example, argue that the law on belligerent
occupation shifted from a focus on the rights of the sovereign state
whose territory is occupied to a focus on the rights of protected persons
62

See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966)
64 See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards,
31 NYU J. INT’L L. POL. 843, 849 (1999) (arguing that the ECHR should show less
deference in case states do not represent the people affected by their actions); ANDREW
LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND
PROPORTIONALITY 27–31 (2012) (arguing that the ECHR does in fact show different levels
of deference to states based on their ability to properly represent the relevant interests);
Shai Dothan, The Three Traditional Approaches to Treaty Interpretation: A Current
Application to the European Court of Human Rights, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 765, 793 (2019)
(arguing that the ECHR is justified in showing less deference to states when they fail to
properly represent the people affected by their actions based on the assumption that
the ultimate source of authority for international courts is individuals and not sovereign
states); ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 210–13 (2014) (arguing that human beings are indeed the
source of authority behind international courts); see also Anne Peters, Humanity as the
A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 514 (2009) (arguing that humanity is in fact
the underlying reason to respect state sovereignty).
63
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living under occupation.65 The assumption that the rights of protected
persons matter more than issues of sovereignty can lead to hypotheses
about concrete legal questions. A possible hypothesis suggests that
courts would allow the occupying power to use natural resources in the
occupied area if it appears to serve the needs of the local population
under occupation. Despite the significant potential for abuse of such a
doctrine by occupying powers, this hypothesis does have some support
from judgments, suggesting that the novel paradigm is indeed a useful
assumption.66
The laws regulating the use of force (jus ad bellum) can serve as
another example. These laws can usually be explained well based on the
assumption of proportionality: every armed attack can be answered
only by using proportional force. However, when a country is exposed
to a series of armed attacks, the “pin-prick doctrine” allows it to respond
with one major strike that is equivalent to the aggregated force of all the
small attacks against it. In some situations, therefore, international law
doctrines can be better explained by an assumption that delayed and
disproportionate retaliation is allowed.67
As these examples demonstrate, the method of legal analysis
advocated here has a key advantage over any scholar’s attempt to debias
herself and provide what seems to her to be an objective view of the law.
The advantage of this method is that any scholar, regardless of his or her
individual biases, can engage in the same empirical investigation. Any
scholar can analyze the same legal materials based on assumptions
shared by the legal community and use them to test hypotheses to
65 See Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution
1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective, 1 IDF L. REV. 19, 28 (2003) (explaining that the
Fourth Geneva Convention from 1949 changed the focus of the law of occupation from
the rights of the ousted government—protected by the Hague Regulations of 1899 and
1907—to the rights of the population under occupation).
66 See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. IDF Commander in the West Bank (2011) ¶¶ 8, 13 to
the opinion of President Dorit Beinisch (The judgment rejected an application against
the operation of Israeli-owned quarries in the occupied West Bank. Though its
reasoning is very controversial, the judgment focuses on the rights of the protected local
population and not on sovereign claims to the territory to reach the conclusion that in
light of the length of the occupation and the potential damage that closing the quarries
would cause to the local economy, the application should be rejected.).
67 See Dothan, supra note 9 at 1090–91 (explaining that the rules on proportional
countermeasures are often useful for securing cooperation, according to the findings of
experimental game theory. In situations of uncertainty about the actions of adversaries,
however, delayed and disproportional reactions are actually better at leading to
cooperation, according to game theorists. Because both doctrines seem to match the
recommendations of game theory in the circumstances in which they are adopted, the
laws of war can be explained as if they strive to minimize conflicts and reach efficient
results. Efficiency is just an assumption made at a higher level of generality and not part
of the nature of the law.).
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explain the law on a certain issue. When assumptions fail to lead to good
hypotheses, they can be discarded and replaced by others.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR LIBERTY
The two preceding arguments for maintaining the use of
assumptions in legal scholarships were arguments about scientific
accuracy. They have to do with maintaining a clear vision of the law that
can avoid unjustified, irrational, or arbitrary legal choices. But there is
another argument for using assumptions that stems from the likely
normative implications of doing away with them. This Part is dedicated
to explaining why assumptions are necessary to sustain any form of
liberal thinking.
A. The Importance of Free Choice
Before dealing with the issue of assumptions, the merit of free
choice must be clarified. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defines the
strongest argument against public interference with people’s private
behavior as the realization that this intervention is likely to cause more
harm than good.68 State intervention is likely to be harmful because
mechanisms for collective decision-making are imperfect, but also
because people usually know better what is good for themselves.
The argument that every adult always knows better than society
what is good for her own well-being may be refuted on empirical
grounds. People are often irrational because they have limited cognitive
abilities and limited willpower. People are also not entirely self-seeking
and may choose to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others.69
Liberalism does not need to be committed to the strong thesis that
people make perfect choices. In fact, it may even concede that given
people’s imperfections and the fact that default choices are not neutral,
the choices available to people should be deliberately engineered to
guide them toward making better decisions.70
Nevertheless, liberalism does need to sustain a commitment to the
following weak thesis: there is some form of connection between how
people behave and what is good for them. If people are making
predictable mistakes, the menu of choices offered to them can be
changed to avoid these mistakes. But if there is absolutely no

68

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 150–51 (1859).
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–79 (1998).
70 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–8 (2008).
69

DOTHAN (DO NOT DELETE)

666

12/23/2020 9:33 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:645

connection between the actions people take and their own well-being,
there is no utilitarian reason to let them choose at all.
There may be other moral reasons not to force people to change
their behavior against their will. But the utilitarian reason is a much
stronger bulwark against tyrants’ claims of greater efficiency. It is
difficult to appreciate why it is so important to let people go about their
own business without realizing that the utility of free choice multiplies
itself infinitely when large groups of people are considered.
Constructing an elaborate choice metric to help one individual make a
decision instead of deciding for her may look wasteful. But when
millions of people have to make many daily decisions simultaneously,
limiting governmental regulation helps reveal boundless information
about what forms of behavior and which transactions are beneficial for
every member of the group. By choosing, people disclose their
preferences. Even when people are nudged in a certain direction, the
act of choosing between options reveals information that sustains a
healthy market.
Adam Smith famously called this phenomenon “the invisible
hand,”71 and Friedrich Hayek elaborated on the way countless
decentralized decisions of self-seeking individuals outperform any
regulator. If people buy what they need when they need it, this leads to
levels of efficiency that are impossible for any central planner.72 Hayek
also warned that even established democracies can easily slide on the
slippery slope that leads from well-intentioned governmental
regulation to the enslavement of society by dictators.73 To prevent the
deterioration of liberal society, a certain humility of lawyers is essential.
B. The Humility of Making Assumptions
Making assumptions is an exercise in humility because it means
being willing to concede that certain relevant facts are unknown. If
lawyers assume that people who sign a contract wish to be bound by its
provisions, they are proceeding on an assumption that may be untrue.
Some people may not be aware of the content of the document they are
signing at all, for example. But for the law, there is a certain predictable
trajectory that goes from human actions to legal consequences. This
trajectory cannot be broken by a claim that other solutions would better
serve people’s welfare.
71 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
Book IV Chapter II Par. 9 (1776, ΜεταLibri 2007).
72 See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 524
(1945).
73 See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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The advantage of making assumptions lies in the fact that the gaps
in the government’s knowledge are filled in a predictable way. The
government does not need to know everything. It makes no claim that
the actions people take are the best for them, all things considered.
Instead, it produces legal implications that usually concur with the
possibility that people do what is good for themselves. In some cases,
the law produces legal implications that concur with the view that
people diverge from what is good for them in predictable and coherent
ways. Either way, the choices people make are meaningful because they
are a factor in the complex equation that determines the legal rule.
Many of the examples mentioned in this Article, such as the
assumption that the law strives for efficiency, may seem distant from
the assumption that people do what suits them best. Nevertheless, these
are just cases in which the link between people’s actions and their legal
implications is more complicated. Indeed, the trajectory that goes from
peoples’ actions to the ultimate legal result may be quite long. One could
claim, for example, that to interpret tort law as if it were efficient the
rules on negligence should be set at a level that leads to optimal
incentives, given a set of assumptions about the rationality of relevant
actors. This does not mean that people will always follow their rational
incentives, but it does mean that there is no need to inquire into people’s
actual preferences and to decide for people what serves their own
interest. In contrast, there is a need to observe what people do and
apply a legal solution based on their actions.
When the government does away with assumptions, it must try to
find out what is going on in people’s minds, and it may determine that
what goes on there is biased in ways that are not predictable. If people
are treated as if they suffer from false consciousness that eliminates the
link between their actions and their personal advantage, that is the end
of liberalism and the end of freedom. Freedom cannot survive when the
government claims to know better than individuals what is good for
them and allows itself to ignore any connection between people’s
actions and their true interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that making
assumptions is a vital tool of legal scholarship. Legal scholars, as
opposed to judges, are not committed to following the normative
strictures of the law. They have a different task: to describe the
normative commitments held by judges. 74 The only way to do that
74

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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properly is by making assumptions, constructing hypotheses based on
them, and then testing these hypotheses against facts.
Proper legal scholarship can be conducted by scholars with a
variety of methodological outlooks. But it is Law and Economics that is
most frequently criticized for making assumptions that are false or
simplistic. The critics do not lie: Law and Economics is really based on
assumptions and is more forthcoming and honest about it than other
methodologies. And it is also true that many of the assumptions made
by Law and Economics scholars are simply untrue. Yet this Article
argues that Law and Economics scholars who make these assumptions
are doing exactly what they are supposed to do. They are following the
proper intellectual process that can lead to progress in legal scholarship.
The reader may ask herself: what are the normative implications of
this argument about how law should be understood? The answer is that
every statement legal scholars make about existing law should follow
the method of making assumptions. Other ways of reasoning fall prey
to unhealthy essentialism that leads to arbitrary decisions, forfeit the
ability to communicate their conclusions effectively with other scholars,
and endanger the most basic liberal principles. This means that
statements about the law that strive to have justifiable normative
implications have to be based on assumptions. Every time a scholar
interprets an ambiguous legal doctrine, she should do so through
assumptions and hypotheses. Instead of saying what should be the
specific recommendations of legal scholarship, this Article explains the
methodology that must be followed to describe the current state of the
law, a prerequisite for making any viable normative recommendation.

